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Abstract: The contribution critically discusses Walton's (and Reed’s and Macagno’s) argumentation scheme 
approach. On the one hand, its enormous richness and closeness to the empirical argumentation material is 
appreciated, but, on the other, fundamental conceptual weaknesses are revealed. Although the approach more 
recently has been declared to strive for “true beliefs and correct choices” it has not systematically developed the 
proposed schemes in a way that these goals are reached. Accordingly, many proposed schemes are fallacious from 
an epistemological standpoint. 
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1. Theories of argument schemes and the aims of this paper 
 
Since the 1980’s, Douglas Walton has developed an argumention schemes approach to 
argumentation, which is laid down in a long series of publications, in part coauthored by other 
scholars. (Some particularly important works are: Walton 1989; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2005; Walton 
& Reed, 2001; Godden & Walton, 2007; Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008; Walton & Sartor, 
2013.) A first compilation of a long list of argumentation schemes was: Walton (1996); by now, 
however, Walton, Reed & Macagno (2008) is the standarad and very handy exposition of this 
approach with a huge list of argumentation schemes. At the latest with the publication of this 
book Walton’s approach was no longer only one of the few main approaches in terms of 
theoretical importance in argumentation theory but has also become one of the most quoted.1 
Walton’s later coauthors notwithstanding, the approach has been developed by him. Therefore, 
sometimes I speak of “Walton” only even though the appertaining reference cites a coauthored 
work of Walton, namely if the respective thought was already present in earlier works of Walton. 
 Argumentation schemes are a topic in every elaborated argumentation theory; such a 
theory must be able to account for and to normatively fix a broad variety of argument schemes. 
Walton’s theory, however, is in particular an argumentation schemes approach to argumentation, 
i.e., an approach that mainly consists in empirically collecting arguments of all types, analyzing 
and evaluating them and bringing them into a normative standard form of an argumentation 
scheme (Walton, 2005, p. 8). Fully elaborated competing argument(ation) theories usually define 
                                                 
1 According to a Google Scholar research (executed on the 10th of March 2016), Walton et al., 2008, with 1466 
quotations, was probably the most quoted monograph in argumentation theory that appeared in the last 25 years (i.e., 
since 1990). “Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies” (1992) by van Eemeren and Grootendorst had 1453 
citations, and their “A Systematic Theory of Argumentation” (from 2008) 1347 citations. Some modern classics, 
though, reach still higher figures: Toulmin’s “The Uses of Argument” (from 1958 et passim): 9712 citations plus 
those from the many translations; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “La nouvelle rhétorique” (1958 et passim) 
together with the English translations: roughly 4725 citations (however, because of the many versions this is very 
difficult to count); Hamblin’s “Fallacies” (from 1970): roughly 1482 citations. 
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arguments functionally, i.e., they define the function of argumentation—e.g., as producing 
consensus (in the Prgama-Dialectics of van Eemeren and Grotendoorst or in Habermas’ 
discourse theory), causing or strengthening the addressee’s belief in the argument’s thesis (in 
rhetoric approaches like that of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca), leading the addressee to 
knowledge or justified acceptable belief (in epistemological approaches, e.g., by Biro, Goldman, 
Lumer, Siegel)—and then they design and define arguments and their validity criteria so as to 
fulfil this function. An argumentation schemes approach does not do so; instead it empirically 
collects from argumentation practice often used argument figures, distinguished by their 
content—like argument from expert opinion, argument from example, from waste, from 
precedent—analyzes their usefulness, thereby distinguishing good versus fallacious arguments, 
and describes them in a canonical form. Hence these are bottom-up approaches to argumentation, 
whereas functionally defined approaches work more top down, combining this, however, with 
bottom-up studies and checks.2 There are several of such specific argumentation schemes 
approaches, beginning with that of Aristotle in his “Topics”, continuing in more recent times 
with that of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), or e.g., Hastings (1963) and Kienpointner 
(1992a). The particular feature of Walton’s argumentation schemes approach is the specific form 
of his schemes together with the fact that every scheme includes also critical questions which 
could be asked by an opponent. Thereby Walton’s approach is inherently dialogical, making its 
success (i.e., “conveying its conclusion” to the respondent (Walton et al., 2008, p. 36)) depend on 
an opponent’s moves. 
 The aim of this paper is to critically discuss Walton’s approach. After presenting this 
approach in somewhat more detail (sect. 2), its strenghts and, in a first round of a general and 
more prima facie critique, some of its problems will be outlined (sect. 3). Subsequently Walton’s 
justifications of his approach, in particular his more recent pragmatic, epistemic justification, 
will be sketched, analyzed and criticized as insufficient and fallacious (sect. 4). Finally, in a 
second, more detailed round of critique, some of the important and typical of Walton’s 
argumentation schemes, will be analyzed in particular with respect to their epistemic value, viz., 
the schemes ‘Argument  from Expert Opinion’ and ‘Practical Reasoning’, and compared with 
respective epistemologically designed schemes (sect. 5). 
 
2.  Main features and the significance of Walton’s approach to argumentation schemes 
 
Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008) define: “Argumentation schemes are forms of argument 
(structures of inference) that represent structures of common types of arguments used in 
everyday discourse, as well as in special contexts like those of legal argumentation and scientific 
argumentation” (p. 1). Walton and his coauthors distinguish three main groups of argument 
schemes, viz., (i) deductive, (ii) inductive, which schematize statistical arguments, e.g., from a 
set of collected data to a statistical conclusion, and (iii) “defeasible”, “presumptive”, 
“plausibilist” or “abductive” schemes (Walton et al., 2008, pp. 1; 10; 12).3 Because probabilistic 
                                                 
2 The bottom-up studies and checks serve, among others, to exploit the empirical wealth of actually advanced 
arguments for theoretical inspiration, to check the applicability of the theoretical approach, and to guarantee the 
completeness of the proposed argument types. Hence functional approaches oscillate between top down and bottom 
up but give more weight to the top down move. A more elaborate description of the (ideal-hermeneutic and 
technical-constructive) method used in a good functional approach in argumentation theory is provided in: (Lumer, 
2011b; Lumer, 1990, pp. 7-19). 
3 Astonishingly, the authors do not mention probabilistic arguments, which are not included in the group of 
presumptive arguments, and they do not seem to count them as “inductive” arguments. 
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arguments are also “defeasible” in Walton’s et al. (2008) terms, and because abduction is a very 
particular inference type I will call the third group “presumptive” or “plausibilist”. Since Walton, 
et al. (2008) seem to think the problem of deductive and inductive arguments to be mainly 
resolved, their argumentation schemes approach is (at least nearly) exclusively intended to 
capture presumptive arguments and to provide a theory for them, which is a long needed 
desideratum.4 
 Walton and his coauthors (2008) see their work in the tradition of works on argument 
schemes, which begins with Aristotle’s “Topics” and more recently has been enriched by authors 
like Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), Arthur Hastings (1963), Manfred Kienpointner 
(1992a; 1992b), Wayne Grennan (1997) or Bart Garssen (1997; 2001; 2002) (Walton et al., 2008, 
pp. 3-4; 8-9). Topics, or “topoi” in Greek, are commonplaces; and the main idea of a topical 
approach to argumentation is to establish collections of powerful contents, i.e., ideas from which 
to argue convincingly, which then are classified according to again contentual categories. And 
this content orientation—as opposed to an approach based on formal criteria—is also present in 
Walton’s argumentation schemes approach. Another source of this theory is Walton’s long-
standing work on fallacies (e.g., 1987; 1995), in which he discusses and analyses traditional 
fallacies and their spheres much in detail on the basis of a rich database of real arguments, 
thereby distinguishing real fallacies from useful arguments, which in the tradition, however, 
often were lumped together. These analyses are, among others, often based on a dialectical 
method, i.e., asking what a respondent could object to the argument, what the arguer could reply 
to the objection and so on, thereby coming to an assessment under which conditions the 
argument could and should be accepted. The argumentation schemes approach then has turned 
this kind of work into the positive. A third inspiration for the collective work and standard 
exposition (Walton et al., 2008), which is new with respect to Walton’s first compilation (1996), 
is the aim to make the schemes usable for argument diagramming with the help of computer 
programs and for artificial intelligence. This has led to giving the schematization a somewhat 
pragmatic touch present in the degree of concreteness and proximity to everyday reasoning. 
Though inserting the upshot of the argument schemes into computer programs requires a certain 
degree of formalization, this is no formalization in the logical sense of individuating the logical 
syntax for proving an inference’s validity. Since this AI element in the approach is irrelevant for 
the more fundamental questions of the approach’s and its schemes’ validity, in the following I 
will not further consider it. 
 A main idea behind Walton’s argument schemes approach is to keep the schemes 
elaborated by the theory near to everyday reasoning or common reasoning in politics or science. 
Therefore, Walton et al. (2008) keep the enthymematic form of everyday reasoning, leaving out 
several premisses which would be essential for the arguments’ possible inferential validity, in 
particular general conditional premisses which could link the explicit singular reasons to the 
conclusion (p. 18). As a consequence, the minimally formalized enthymeme—where names or 
singular terms occurring in the enthymeme are replaced by variables, but the rest (predicates, 
logical operators …) is left as it were—already makes up the argument scheme. However, as a 
compensation, so to speak, Walton appends to each scheme a precise set of “critical questions”.5 
These questions (i) in part ask for justifications or clarifications of the given premisses or (ii) 
even question them; (iii) another part instead asks for missing premisses; and (iv) some of the 
                                                 
4 This exclusive tendency is so strong that Walton sometimes even denies the existence of other than presumptive 
argumentation schemes (e.g., Walton & Sartor, 2012, p. 111). 
5 The idea to add specific critical questions to every argument scheme goes back to Hastings (1963). 
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critical questions ask for further information, in particular for possible counter-evidences. The 
last group is Walton’s way to deal in particular with presumptive arguments, which are uncertain 
or, in Walton’s terms, “defeasible”, such that the conclusion may be false though all premisses 
are true and though they “plausibilistically” imply the conclusion. Because of their uncertainty, 
presumptive arguments are non-monotonic, i.e., further information may reveal the conclusion’s 
falseness or its doubtfulness and hence require a revision of the former result. The fourth group 
of critical questions asks for such counter-evidences.6 Generally speaking, the critical questions, 
according to Walton et al. (2008), express the defeasibility of plausibilist arguments (p. 8). So on 
the one hand in Walton’s argument schemes an enthymematical form is preserved, on the other 
the respondent gets a list of what he might ask or question or attack. 
 Another characteristic feature of Walton’s argument schemes is that they are defined and 
distinguished from each other in terms of their content, like “argument from position to know”, 
“argument from expert opinion”, “argument from sunk costs”, “argument from sign”, “argument 
from rules”, or “argument for an exceptional case”. Being schemes, of course, they contain still 
types of contents (propositions with variables for singular terms), not individual contents. 
Because of the contentual differentiation, two (according to Walton different) schemes can have 
the same logical form; several schemes, e.g., have a modus ponens form, among others: the 
Rhetorical Argument from Oppositions, in the normative as well as in the descriptive variant 
(Walton et al., 2008, p. 318); the Argument from Bias (Walton et al., 2008, p. 338); variants 1 
and 2 of the Argument from Rules (Walton et al., 2008, p. 343). This orientation towards 
contents may be due to the Aristotelian tradition or due to the aim to remain near to the everyday 
practice; another reason may be that in particular the fourth group of critical questions, which 
asks for counter-evidences, can give much more specific indications if the argument’s content is 
determined. 
 All these characteristic features then lead to argument schemes (plus critical questions) 
like the following two: 
 
1. ARGUMENT FROM POSITION TO KNOW 
Major Premise: Source s is in position to know about things in a certain subject 
domain f containing proposition p. 
Minor Premise: s asserts that p is true (false). 
Conclusion: p is true (false). 
CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
CQ1: Is s in position to know whether p is true (false)? 
CQ2: Is s an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source? 
CQ3: Did s assert that p is true (false)?” (Walton et al., 2008, p. 309; variables 
changed to my own system, C.L.) 
 
2. ARGUMENT FROM EXPERT OPINION 
Major premise: Source e is an expert in subject domain f containing proposition p. 
Minor premise: e asserts that p is true (false). 
Conclusion: p is true (false). 
                                                 
6 Further information can also strengthen the case for the thesis, make it more plausible or even certain. This may 
happen not only during further research but also in cooperative argumentative dialogues if the respondent is 
interested in cooperatively settling a question. Walton and co. do not mention this possibility, perhaps because they 
conceive of argumentative dialogues always (or at least mainly) as adversarial. 
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CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
CQ1: Expertise Question: How credible is e as an expert source? 
CQ2: Field Question: Is e an expert in the field that p is in? 
CQ3: Opinion Question: What did e assert that implies p? 
CQ4: Trustworthiness Question: Is s personally reliable as a source? 
CQ5: Consistency Question: Is p consistent with what other experts assert? 
CQ6: Backup Evidence Question: Is e’s assertion based on evidence?” (Walton et 
al., 2008, p. 309; variables changed to my own system, C.L.) 
 
If a scheme speaks of a “true” proposition Walton et al., (2008) mostly add also the variant 
“(false)”—as in the just given examples; this is superfluous since, e.g., the variant of the Minor 
Premise “e asserts that proposition p is false” is equivalent to: “e asserts that proposition non-p is 
true”, where however also the proposition non-p is covered by the general variable “p” in the 
positive variant of the Minor Premise: “e asserts that proposition p is true”. Therefore, I will 
often omit the ‘(false)’ variant.  
 The critical questions are intended to be tools for a respondent who thus gets suggestions 
for possible critical replies to the argument. This is one main aspect of the fact that Walton et al. 
(2008) understand presumptive argumentation as a dialogical enterprise and they design 
argumentation schemes and their theoretization accordingly. On this line they also define an 
argument’s failure and an argument’s success or positive quality as well as the mechanism which 
leads to the “bindingness” of schemes in dialogic terms: An argument is defeated if the 
respondent asks an appropriate critical question that is not answered by the proponent (Walton et 
al., 2008, pp. 3, 9). Advancing an argument shifts the burden of proof, and asking the critical 
question shifts it back again, etc. (Walton et al., 2008, pp. 12, 35-37). In the end holds: “A 
presumptive argumentation scheme imposes a relation of conveyance on the respondent such that 
if he accepts the premises, and if the scheme is applicable, and if all the requirements of the 
scheme are met, the conclusion is conveyed to him by these factors.” And this means “that he has 
now been given a cogent reason for accepting it.” (Walton et al., 2008, p. 36.) 
 The feature of the collective work of Walton, Reed and Macagno which make it a 
practical standard exposition of Walton’s Argumentation Schemes Approach is that it gathers all 
schemes so far dealt with by Walton and brings them into a uniform and handy format. This 
collection is called “compendium” and contains 60 main argument schemes and a further 44 sub-
schemes together, of course, with the appertaining critical questions (Walton et al., 2008, pp. 
308-346). Among the 104 listed schemes only 23 are deductively valid and another five are 
analytically valid, i.e., deductively valid if supplemented by analytically true premises (my 
classifications and counts).7 Hence the remaining 76 schemes should be presumptive argument 
schemes—like the two examples quoted above. Among the presumptive argumentation schemes 
many resemble general modus ponens; however their Major Premise often contains 
qualifications like “generally”; this makes the argument “defeasible”; therefore, Walton et al. 
(2008) call their structure “defeasible modus ponens structure” (p. 365). 
                                                 
7 The deductively valid schemes are: 4, 11.1, 11.2, 12.1, 12.2, 13.2, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.2, 21.1, 21.2, 26, 26.1, 32.2, 
38, 41, 46, 48, 55.1, 55.2, 55.3, 56; the following schemes are analytically valid: 3, 44, 51, 54.2. The deductive 
inference forms are: 11.1, 11.2, 12.1, 12.2, 21.1, 21.2, 46, 55.1, 55.2, 55.3, 56 modus ponens; 16, 17 modus ponens 
with two conditions; 48 iterated modus ponens; 14, 15, 18.2, 41 general modus ponens; 38 general modus ponens 
with three conditions; 26, 26.1, 32.2 modus tollens; 13.2 alternative. (cf. Walton et al., 2008, pp. 310-344). 
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 So, to come to a first conclusion, Walton’s argumentation scheme approach has among 
others the following strengths. It is empirically supported by a huge data base of argumentation 
examples; so, the proposed schemes, first, are not simply invented but have their empirical 
counterparts, second, have a format near to the found arguments, thereby easily to be handled 
also by layman, and, third, cover a great portion of argument types found in everyday reasoning. 
The proposed schemes are handily and clearly elaborated in a uniform and tight format and 
collected in the compendium, which is a very rich reference text. The critical questions 
appertaining to each scheme, in case of uncertain arguments, remind us of this uncertain nature 
and give hints to possible confutations or possible relevant information. Most of the schemes of 
the compendium are accomponied by references to literature (most of it by Walton), where the 
respective scheme is discussed further, e.g., with respect to its precise meaning and value. 
However, Walton’s argumentation scheme approach (as a general theory of argumentation) also 
has some weaknesses, to which I turn now. 
 
3.  A first critical assessment of Walton’s approach 
 
3.1. Problems of argumentation schemes approaches to argumentation in general 
 
Walton’s is one of several argumentation schemes approaches to argumentation, i.e., approaches 
which empirically collect, analyze and evaluate argument types and bring them in a normative 
standard form which always is defined including also contentual terms. All such approaches 
suffer from three interrelated argumentation theoretical problems. First, the lists of resulting 
schemes are long, often very long, never complete and always arbitrary in what they include and 
exclude. Second, today’s approaches should not be contentual but formal, thereby explaining the 
contents. Third, there is no further (more general) theory behind these lists of schemes, which 
could explain and guarantee the schemes’ validity or some other form of value as well as bring 
us nearer to a really complete list. I briefly explain these problems. 
 While the list in Walton (1996) still contained 25 argumentation schemes, in the 
compendium there are already 104 schemes (Walton et al., 2008, pp. 308-346). The lists in the 
other extended and important collections provided within the argumentation schemes approach 
(e.g. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958; Kienpointner, 1992a, pp. 250-402 (58 main argument 
schemes plus 15 sub-schemes)) have similar dimensions. In addition, these lists are far from 
being complete—though Walton et al. (2008) for their compendium affirm something near to the 
opposite.8 In their compendium, however, apart from probabilistic arguments most deductive 
arguments are missing as are many others, e.g., a really comprehensive practical justification of 
value judgements, of actions or of instruments, arguments for definitions, arguments from 
definitions, interpretative arguments, arguments from historical sources and historiographic 
arguments in general, complex arguments of any form. Furthermore, all argument schemes 
primarily used in scientific contexts, from statistical arguments to arguments in favour of a 
theory, are missing as well. The compendium of Walton et al. (2008) probably does not even 
contain 1% of the total of argumentation schemes which could be generated in the same style. 
Most of their schemes have the deductive or “defeasible” modus ponens form. However, modus 
ponens in deductive logic is only one type of deductively valid inferences; as a student in a logic 
                                                 
8 “The defeasible schemes listed in the compendium represent the most common forms of reasoning not only in 
everyday discourse, but also in special contexts of use like legal and scientific reasoning” (Walton et al., 2008, p. 
364). 
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class I got a list with “the most important deductive inferences” containing roughly 150 formally 
defined inference types of propositional and predicate logic (i.e., without special logics like 
modal or deontic logic). Similar conditions hold in probability theory for probabilistic 
inferences. Theses numbers then can be multiplied by filling these different inference forms with 
typical contents. Already the extensions of the actually presented lists of argumentation schemes 
make the respective approaches and their inherent method for assessing arguments confusing, 
laborious to handle, and hard to memorize—which all leads to difficulties in learning 
argumentation skills (cf. Hansen 2011). Large extension of a subject matter by itself is not an 
essential objection—e.g., vocabulary lists are much longer and nonetheless unavoidable in 
foreign language acquisition. However, large extension is an objection with some weight if it is 
possible to construct an approach to argumentation schemes which is more concise and comes 
much nearer to completeness. And this is possible with the help of a much more formal 
approach, which leaves the contentual completion of formal schemes as well as, the other way 
round, the idenfication of the form of a concrete argument mostly to the user (cf. e.g., Lumer, 
2011c; Lumer, forthcoming). 
 On the other hand, the lists compiled in argumentation schemes approaches mostly 
contain many superfluous entries. In the compendium of Walton et al. (2008), e.g., all the 
subtypes of the argument from popular opinion (pp. 311-313) intuitively seem to be too near to 
other schemes already listed or to be fallacious.9 More generally, most of their listed deductive 
schemes admittedly (Walton et al., 2008, p. 365) have the modus ponens or the general modus 
ponens form, whereas the defeasible schemes mostly have the form of what the authors call a 
“defeasible modus ponens” (Walton et al., 2008, p. 365). If the compendium in general already 
contains so many schemes, why do so many schemes of the same form have to be included into 
the list? Why does it not suffice to include only the form of the arguments so that countless 
specializations of this form can be constructed by the users of the compendium?—If a list of 
argument schemes, on the one hand, is grossly incomplete and, on the other, many entries seem 
to be superfluous this is some evidence for the possibility that the list is arbitrary. 
 Walton’s schemes as well as those of other argumentation schemes approaches are 
essentially defined in contentual terms, such that, as just said, many listed schemes have the 
same logical form (see also above, sect. 2). However, such a contentual approach in important 
respects is similar to learning a foreign language by memorizing complete forms of sentences 
(with just some names to be filled in) and their meaning, instead of learning the vocabulary and 
the grammatical rules. With such a method, one’s linguistic and argumentation competence will 
be quantitatively very restricted, capturing only a minor fraction of a language’s resp. the 
argumentative domain’s richness. In terms of argumentation schemes this must lead to a quite 
incomplete compendium. Furthermore, one will not understand the sentences’ structure, and in 
the argumentative domain one will not understand why an argument is good, argumentatively 
valid and proving its thesis or at least showing the thesis’ acceptability. Such understanding can 
only be reached by a formal approach, since the deductive validity of a deductive argument and 
thereby the “transfer” of the truth value depends on the logical-syntactical form of the 
                                                 
9 Just two examples: Scheme 4.2. (Position-to-Know Ad Populum Argument) says: “Everybody in this group G 
accepts A. […] This group is in a special position to know that A is true. […] Therefore, A is (plausibly) true” 
(Walton et al., 2008, p. 311). This is only some generalization of scheme 1 (Argument from Position to Know): 
“Source a is in position to know about things in a certain subject domain S containing proposition A. […] a asserts 
that A is true […]. Conclusion: A is true […]” (Walton et al., 2008, p. 309). And scheme 4.1. (Pop Scheme): 
“Everybody in a particular reference group G accepts […] A. Conclusion: A is true / or: you should accept […] A” 
(Walton et al., 2008, 311) is simply fallacious. 
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argument’s propositions; and the validity of a probabilistic argument depends on its form in 
probability theoretic terms as well as arithmetic equations; similar considerations hold for 
practical arguments for value judgements. 
 Argumentation schemes approaches to argumentation compile their lists of argumentation 
schemes on the basis of empirical research in data bases. This is essentially a bottom-up method 
of empirically collecting schemes without any deeper theory. These approaches do not develop a 
functional conception of arguments, which establishes what the (standard) function of arguments 
is, for subsequently constructing arguments, argument schemes or, still more generally, argument 
meta-schemes (Lumer, forthcoming) which are able to fulfill this function or to assess whether 
they fulfill it. And without such a functional account which leads to a real theory, neither the 
completeness nor the simplicity of a compendium of schemes can be achieved; furthermore, the 
quality of the arguments cannot be justified and new good arguments cannot be invented. 
 The question of whether and why an argumentation scheme is good or valid and hence to 
be included into the compendium of argumentation schemes is particularly important in 
argumentation theory and, as just said, can be answered satisfactorily only with the help of a 
functional theory. Therefore, Walton et al. (2008) have tried to give a general answer to this 
question (mainly in section 1.8., “How Are Schemes Binding?”, pp. 34-38), which however only 
confirms that they do not have any good explanation and theory and, as a consequence, no good 
justifications why to include a scheme into the compendium or exclude it. First they try to 
explain the “bindingness” by what they call the “shifting burden of proof theory of the binding 
nature of argumentation schemas” (Walton et al., 2008, p. 35): Putting forward an argument 
fitting to one of the schemes included in the compendium shifts the burden of proof to the 
respondent, who now, by posing critical question may shift the burden of proof back to the 
arguer. However, what is going on here is next explained in terms of cogency and argument 
suffiency: A cogent presumptive argument that meets the criteria of acceptability, relevance and 
sufficiency of premises, puts some pressure on the repsondent to either accept the conclusion or 
to give a good reason why not. This normative cogency means that a rational arguer should 
accept the conclusion under these conditions (Walton et al., 2008, p. 35); if she does not she is 
illogical (Walton et al., 2008, 36). Next, a further attempt is made to explain the bindingness by 
the “relation of conveyance” (Walton et al., 2008, 36), which for presumptive schemes however 
leads back to the notion of shifting the burden of proof in a dialogue and this again to the 
cogency with its necessity for a rational person to accept the conclusion because otherwise she 
would be illogical or unreasonable (Walton et al., 2008, 36). To cut a longer analysis short: I find 
this hard to understand; this moving back and forth between four ideas (burden of proof, 
cogency, logical rationality, conveyance) about the “bindingness” or more generally the 
goodness of argumentation schemes shows more the authors’ helplessness in explaining the 
value of and the meta-criteria behind their schemes than explaning anything. The most basic 
concept in the end seems to be ‘(logical) rationality’. However, we are never told, why accepting 
a thesis on the basis of an argumentation scheme included into the compendium would be 
reasonable or logical and not accepting it unreasonable or illogical. The concepts of truth and 
knowledge are lacking entirely, and the burden of proof idea has something of an agonistic 
conception of argumentative dialogues; ‘shifting the burden of proof’ could turn out to be like a 
move in a game of chess: defined by the rules but without epistemic or alethic content. 
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3.2. Some specific problems of Walton’s argumentation schemes approach 
 
Prima facie most distinguishing of Walton’s theory as compared to other argumentation schemes 
approaches is the addition of critical questions to the schemes proper and thereby a dialogical 
conception of argumentation. To begin with the last point: The quality, validity or acceptability 
of an argument and hence the truth, probability or acceptability of its conclusion can hardly be a 
question of dialogue and burden of proof because we can use these arguments privately, for 
ourselves or scrutinize e.g. written arguments of arguers who are unreachable for us (dead, 
staying in distant places, etc.) for epistemic purposes, i.e., for examining whether the thesis is 
true. In such cases there is no respondent and no burden of proof.10 In addition, if I present a bad 
argument to a clever or to a simple addressee where the latter accepts nearly everything and the 
former nearly nothing of my argument this does not change anything with regard to the quality of 
my argument—whereas the necessary dialogic character of arguments puts an element of 
arbitrariness into the argumentation: how does the responendent react? The fact that an arguer 
can pose the critical questions herself and then reply to them shows that for the critical process 
intended by Walton and company no dialogue partner is needed, neither a real nor an internalized 
dialogue partner. If I direct one of Walton’s critical questions to myself this need not even mean 
that I try to figure out how other people will or would react, it can simply be part of a self-
assurance whether the thesis in question is really true. After posing the question I may again 
scrutinize the premisses, the inference relation or, in case of uncertain arguments, more 
directedly look for conflicting information. That it is another person who makes an objection is 
not essential for questioning the truth, but it is the objection’s content, e.g., a hint to an error in 
an inference or a premise, to an information in contrast to the thesis etc. Instead, in Walton’s 
approach, posing critical questions and shifting the burden of proof presupposes real 
argumentation partners; and if the critical question is not posed or the burden of proof not shifted 
back then the argumentation is successful. Furthermore, argument schemes in other 
argumentation schemes approaches and arguments in argumentation theory in general are 
sequences of judgements (some say also: of assertions). Their conceptualization as necessarily 
dialogical is an unjustified reform. Of course, arguments can be embedded in argumentative 
dialogues. But by making the critical questions an essential part of the argumentation, this 
possible dialogical embedding gets obligatory or, more precisely, the argument(ation) itself is 
already dialogical. 
 Keeping in mind this possibly non-dialogical role of critical questions, let us examine 
more precisely, with the help of the already considered scheme for arguments from position to 
know, what their function is, in particular to what extent they can play the role to explain and 
guarantee the plausibility of the thesis in orderly composed presumptive arguments. The scheme 
with the critical question were: 
 
                                                 
10 Ian Dove has once replied to this objection that even if an adequate partner for a dialogue is missing this does not 
make dialogicity of argumentation problematic, one can imagine an ideal or abstract partner; Plato is not present for 
answering to our critical questions, but we can figure out nonetheless whether an advocat of Platonism would be 
able to answer to our critical questions. And if I myself am the argument’s addressee, I can function as an arguer as 
well as an addressee (Dove, 2011, p. 3). However, this is a misunderstanding. I would not deny Dove’s point; it is 
obviously true. But instead of being in opposition to what I have said it is near to what I wanted to say: The fact that 
we can imagine ourselves what the dialogue partner might say shows that the argument’s validity is independent of a 
dialogue partner. 
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 1. ARGUMENT FROM POSITION TO KNOW 
 Major premise: Source s is in position to know about things in a certain subject 
domain f containing proposition p. 
 Minor premise: s asserts that p is true (false). 
Conclusion: p is true (false). 
CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
CQ1: Is s in position to know whether p is true (false)? 
CQ2: Is s an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source? 
CQ3: Did s assert that p is true (false)? (Walton et al. 2008, p. 309; variables 
changed to my system, C.L.) 
 
Questions CQ1 and CQ3 only ask for the truth of the premises, which could be done for every 
premise of every argument. Hence, these critical questions do not add anything new regarding 
presumptive arguments. (As a matter of fact, however, Walton and his coauthors give a special 
twist to CQ1 and CQ3: CQ1: What kind of expertise does s exactly have to be in a position to 
know about p? Or CQ3: What exactly did s say that implies p? But even this more specific 
understanding of CQ1 and CQ3 only points to critical aspects of the premises, where their 
examination—if there was any—might have been superficial and the result false. Such hints can 
be useful but this does not change anything with respect to the question of the schemes validity: 
It invites more careful attention in checking the premisses’ truth, but it does not contribute 
anything to answering the question whether, why, “to what degree” the conclusion is true if the 
premisses are true.) The only new point is touched upon in question CQ2: Is the source honest 
(trustworthy, reliable)? A too obvious objection regarding this question, however, is: why has the 
answer to this question not been inserted into the argument as a further premise in the first place? 
The authors ask this question themselves (Walton et al. 2008, pp. 18-21, 32 ff.), but they do not 
give a real answer to it. The main reason seems to be that in this way the enthymematic structure 
of everyday reasoning is preserved such that their reconstruction is better accessible and nearer 
to this practice (cf. Walton et al., 2008, p. 18). However, first, the connection to our everyday 
reasoning can also be preserved by distinguishing between ideal schemes, which contain all 
necessary premises, and non-ideal but still valid schemes where under certain conditions, in 
particular if the missing parts are constructable from the given, some premises may be left out— 
as it is done in the epistemological approach.11 Second, it is much clearer to put all the necessary 
premisses into the argument scheme because in this way it is revealed on which conditions the 
thesis’ truth or acceptability depends, so that the fulfillment of these conditions can be 
systematically checked by the arguer and the addressee; all the premises will be examined, and 
having now the complete set of premises, as well as the conclusion present, the inferential 
relation can also be reviewed much better. So let us assume that the judgement ‘s is an honest 
(trustworthy, reliable) source’ is added to the above cited scheme as a further premise. This does 
not yet make the scheme deductively valid, it remains an uncertain scheme. Now, however, no 
                                                 
11 Cf. e.g., Lumer (2005a, pp. 235-236): Conditions A2.2 and A5.4 of the definition of an ‘argumentatively valid 
argument’ permit us to leave out reasons of the ideal version, however, within certain limits, namely that the ideal 
version can rather easily be constructed from the rest that remains. The special conditions for singular argument 
types in Lumer (1990, pp. 258-259, 277-278, 362-363, 365-366) always distinguish between ideal and not ideal 
though still argumentatively valid arguments by means of a “liberalization rule”, which permits us to leave implicit 
certain reasons. (In Lumer, (forthcoming) the steps from a not ideal though argumentatively valid argument to the 
ideal version are explained in more detail.) 
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critical question is left over, the critical question approach of presumptive arguments has 
vanished, leaving behind a presumptive argument scheme without any theoretical approach to 
explain its validity, acceptability or quality. 
 As just said, the scheme obtained by putting the further premise contained hidden in the 
critical questions into the scheme itself, i.e., ‘Source s is in position to know about things in a 
certain subject domain f containing proposition p. s is an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source. s 
asserts that p is true. Conclusion: p is true.’, is neither deductively nor analytically valid. Even if 
someone is in a position to know about p he need not know whether p, even if he asserts that p: 
he may not have examined at all whether p; the verification may have been false nonetheless; he 
may have forgotten the correct result, etc. And even if the source knows the truth about p and is 
generally honest and trustworthy he may have a particular reason in this situation to tell lies. The 
facts stressed in the premises only make it probable that the source knows whether p and that he 
is truthful, thereby making p probable as well. This result, however, suggests an adequate 
reconstruction of the example as a probabilistic argument, e.g., as: 
 
Basic probability establishing argument from prosition to know: 
P1:  Source s is in position to know about things in the subject domain f of p. 
P2: s is an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source.  
P3: s asserts that p is true. 
P4: If an honest person asserts a proposition x which is in his sphere of 
competence then x is true in the vast majority (about 95%) of cases. 
(P5: The addressee has no better relevant information about s and p than that 
expressed in P1-P4.) 
T p is highly probable (has a probability of 0.95).  
 
Such a probabilistic reconstruction provides a clear structure for the argument in question and a 
strong epistemological underpinning, namely probability theory. Probability theory would 
constitute the basis of an enormous wealth of probabilistic argument schemes. However, 
Walton’s, Reed’s and Macagno’s compendium does not contain any probabilistic argument. 
 Rather, Walton rejects this possibility of a probabilistic reconstruction of uncertain 
arguments like the argument from position to know explicitly. Salmon (1964) had already made a 
proposal for a probabilistic reconstruction of arguments from position to know—by the way, 
with similar critical questions as in Walton’s conceptualization. (The main difference of 
Salmon’s scheme (1964) as compared to the reconstruction just given is that Salmon locates the 
uncertainty in the transition from the premises to the conclusion and does not qualify the 
conclusion itself as uncertain (e.g., by inserting a degree of probability smaller than one into it).) 
Walton (1996) argues against Salmon’s proposal that it leads to problems: If the argument 
attributes a (high) probability of w to the proposition p, then, according to the axioms of the 
probability calculus, the probability of not-p is 1-w. If, however, now another person (also in a 
position to know about p) asserts that not-p, then we have to assign to not-p also the probability 
w – which however with w being high, i.e. w is in any case far above 0.5 and hence w  1-w, is 
impossible according to the probability calculus. Therefore, such arguments are not probabilistic 
(Walton says “inductive”) (Walton, 1996, pp. 64-65.) However, first, it is a general rule in 
probability theory, which often remains unstated but has even been made explicit by Salmon 
(1964), that only the best information at hand should be used as premises for a probabilistic 
inference. This rule has been made explicit as premise P5 (the No Better Information premise) in 
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my own reconstruction of the argument from position to know; and Salmon (1964), when 
explaning his argument scheme, explicitly says—without inserting this as an explicit premise 
into the argument—that the complete data (with respect to the considered case) has to be used as 
the inferential basis. So, Walton’s extension of the example would violate both provisos (premise 
P5 as well as Salmon’s rule of the complete data): The newly acquired information about the 
second person in a position to know asserting the contrary of p would obviously be relevant 
information, thus making the old argument obsolete or outdated and it would require a 
calculation on the basis of the thus enlarged data base. Second, Walton’s argument against the 
(simplistic) probabilistic conceptualization of arguments from position to know, mutatis 
mutandis, holds for his own argumentation scheme of Arguments from Position to Know as well. 
And this scheme does not contain any way out like my premise P5; hence Walton’s argument 
refutes his own scheme really. 
 Walton (2005) justifies the dialogical conceptualization and the inclusion of critical 
questions with the non-monotonicity of presumptive argumentation. He writes: Presumptive 
argument schemes cannot be context-free analyzed like deductive arguments, because new 
evidence may make the argument default. Therefore, these arguments have to be analyzed and 
evaluated in light of their context. And the right means to bring in this contextual embedding is 
the dialogical conceptualization of “argumentation as a sequence of moves made by two 
participants in a goal directed-dialogue”. (Walton, 2005, pp. 7 ff.; cf. also Walton, 2005, pp. 8 
ff.). Walton is right in holding that the non-monotonicity of uncertain arguments requires to 
include a contextual element into their respective schemes. However, this contextual element 
need not be the embedding into a dialogue. The reference to a data-base (as in the above premise 
P5 of the basic probability establishing argument from prosition to know) provides this context 
relation as well; and it is more adequate because it makes clear of what the usability and 
usefulness of an uncertain argument really depends on, viz. that no better information is 
available. 
 So, Walton (with Reed and Macagno following him), has decided, for rather weak 
reasons, to give the argument schemes an enthymematic form but adding to the schemes the 
critical questions: (i) Some of these critical questions, as we have seen above, ask for what in 
most other accounts would be implicit premises, (ii) other critical questions instead question the 
given premises or (iii) ask for their justification, (iv) still others, e.g., CQ5 for the argument from 
expert opinion (Walton et al., pp. 15, 33, 310), ask for information, in particular counter-
evidence, which might undermine the applicability of the argument. Even if one accepts the 
critical question format, these different functions of the critical questions should be specified. 
This holds for reasons of clarity, because insufficient or problematic answers to questions with 
different functions have quite different implications: (i) If a missing premise is false the 
argument is unsound (and thus argumentatively invalid) and of no epistemic use. (ii) The same 
holds if a given premise is false. (iii) If a given premise cannot be justified it may still be true, 
however, and the argument argumentatively valid but the argument is no longer adequate in the 
present situation since the arguer and the addressee have no epistemic access to this premise; but 
it may be adequate perhaps later on, after acquiring new information. (iv) If a critical question 
has brought up counter-evidence, the no-better-information condition (cf. above P5 in my 
reconstruction) is violated; this leaves the argument argumentatively valid (or invalid) as before 
but now it is no longer adequate and will not be so in the future because its restricted information 
basis has been overcome, it is now outdated. Whereas critical questions for missing premises (i) 
and for a justification of a given premise (iii) ask for further information and can be posed by the 
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addressee without committing him, questioning a given premise (ii) or bringing forward counter-
evidences (iv) are moves where the addressee has to provide information. Hence the latter two 
moves, properly understood, are not questions to the arguer, who then has to reply, but 
invitations to the addressee to look for possible counter-evidences or contrasting information and 
to produce respective counter-arguments himself. This implies that Walton’s and his coauthors 
general criterion for a successful defeat—“if the respondent asks one of the critical questions 
matching the scheme and the poponent fails to offer an adequate answer, the argument defaults” 
(Walton et al., 2008, p. 9)—cannot be true. (Walton et al., (2008), in the general part of their 
book, differentiate functions i, ii and iv, and state that the latter type of question is a question for 
a possible rebuttal and together with attack on a premise (ii), however, in contrast to question (i) 
and (iii), has to be supplemented by bringing in counter-evidence, so that these two questions are 
accomponied by a burden of proof of the respondent (pp. 32-33). Nonetheless, the three authors 
do not include a hint to these different functions and the respective dialogical obligations into 
their compendium.) Furthermore, again even if one accepts the enthymematic format of the 
schemes, either the enthymeme or the critical questions should contain all necessary premises for 
making the argument inferentially valid. However, many of the argumentation schemes in the 
compendium are not complete in this respect. In particular often the real major premise, which 
connects the given premises with the conclusion, is missing. This holds, e.g., for the above 
quoted scheme “Argument from position to know”, which does not contain any counterpart to 
the major premise P4 in my own (probabilistic) reconstruction of this argumentation scheme.12 
This is a very serious defect since thus an essential condition of the thesis’ truth or acceptability 
remains unmentioned and, therefore, will not be checked in considering the argument and in 
examining its thesis. (I have not found an argument of Walton or his coauthors for why these 
essential premises are not included into the schemes.) 
 As a consequence of the discussed problems many of the argumentation schemes in the 
compendium (Walton et al. 2008, pp. 308-346) are not argumentatively valid from an 
epistemological point of view: They do not satisfactorily lead an addreessee to a justified belief 
in the thesis via listing sufficient conditions for the thesis’ truth or acceptability, thereby inviting 
us to check these conditions. And I do not see that these critical schemes of the compendium are 
good in some other major functional respect. More precisely, 79 (76%!) of the 104 schemes are 
argumentatively invalid: Four of these 79 schemes (viz., schemes 21.1, 21.2, 38, 41) are 
deductively valid but contain a false premise. Further 18 plausibilist schemes (viz. schemes 1, 2, 
4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 13.1, 22.3, 27, 28, 30, 31.2, 40, 54.1, 54.3, 58, 59.1, 59.2, 60.) are not 
argumentatively valid but can easily be repaired by rather simple additions, mostly in the way 
taken above, in the reconstruction of the scheme ‘argument from position to know’ (i.e. by 
                                                 
12 These major premisses are mostly those which in Toulmin’s theory are called “warrants” (or “(material) inference 
rules”). Walton et al. (2008) also refer to them in this way (pp. 32). This (implicit) reference to Toulmin and his 
theory of material inference rules may explain why the authors resist to include these premisses into the schemes 
themselves (though it still remains astonishing why in the cases they do not include a question for these premisses 
into the set of critical questions they do not do so). But it reveals also their somewhat hidden reliance on this 
strongly criticized and untenable theory of material inference rules. After all, the missing major premisses, i.e., 
Toulmin’s “inference rules”, are not inference rules at all, they do not say ‘from p you can infer q, i.e. if p is true q is 
necessarily true as well’, instead they are (often) material implications: ‘if p then q’ or ‘for all x holds: if x is F then 
x is G’. And Toulmin’s backings may be reasons for these material implications but they are definitely not reasons 
for an inference rule; inference rules would have to be justified with a much more elaborate theory. Toulmin’s 
theory instead altogether lacks a theory of inferences which could explain why his inferences are truth-preserving. 
(For further criticism see e.g., Cooley, 1959.) 
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inserting the major premise, minor premises asked for in the critical questions, by making the 
argument probabilistic etc.). The other 57 (viz., schemes 4.1, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 5, 
6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7, 8.1, 8.2, 9.1, 9.2, 10.1, 10.2, 18.1, 19.1, 19.2, 20, 22.1, 22.2, 22.4, 22.5, 22.6, 
23, 24, 25, 26.2, 29, 31.1, 31.3, 31.4, 31.5, 32.1, 33.1, 33.2, 33.3, 33.4, 34, 35, 35.1, 36, 37, 39, 
42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 52, 53, 57) of the argumentatively invalid schemes cannot easily be repaired: 
too many premises are missing, or the missing premises are not obvious, or their thesis is too 
strong and it is not obvious how to weaken it, or their structure is altogether inappropriate; the 
practical argumentation schemes and the arguments from analogy nearly all have the latter 
defect. The border between what is easily repairable and what is not is not very precise, but this 
does not change the dimensions of the problem of argumentative invalidity. Apart from the 
particular defects listed, the basic failure leading to the invalidity problem is the lack of a real 
theory behind the approach. The most obvious kind of theory in this case would be an 
instrumentalist theory, i.e., a theory which would determine the standard function of arguments 
and then design argument schemes as means to fulfil this function. In particular Walton’s 
approach does not try to guarantee the epistemological function of arguments, i.e., to generate 
rationally justified belief (by leading an addressee in recognizing the fulfilment of some 
sufficient conditions of the thesis’ acceptability). Accordingly, the specific makeup of the single 
schemes is not justified in terms of such a functionality, i.e. by showing that the schemes fulfil 
some validity standard. (Futhermore, even the precise formats (e.g., whether the thesis includes a 
modifier like “plausible” and, if yes, exactly which one) are quite inhomogeneous and their 
choice often seems quite arbitrary, the effect of a momentary decision.) More generally, without 
a functional approach neither the completeness (or something near to completeness) nor the 
simplicity of a compendium of schemes can be achieved; furthermore, the quality of the 
arguments cannot be justified and new good arguments cannot be invented. 
 
4.  A detailed epistemological critique of Walton’s argument schemes 
 
As just said, argument schemes should be justified comparatively in a complex practical 
argument which shows that they are the best among the relevant options. Are Walton’s 
argumentation schemes good or even the best as compared to their alternatives? The present 
section will examine one major example of Walton’s schemes with respect to this question, 
thereby giving particular attention to its epistemic value: argument from expert opinion. 
 Arguments from expert opinion in the compendium are schematized as follows: 
 
ARGUMENT FROM EXPERT OPINION 
Major premise: Source e is an expert in subject domain f containing proposition p. 
Minor premise: e asserts that p is true (false). 
Conclusion: p is true (false). 
CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
CQ1: Expertise Question: How credible is e as an expert source? 
CQ2: Field Question: Is e an expert in the field that p is in? 
CQ3: Opinion Question: What did e assert that implies p? 
CQ4: Trustworthiness Question: Is s personally reliable as a source? 
CQ5: Consistency Question: Is p consistent with what other experts assert? 
CQ6: Backup Evidence Question: Is e’s assertion based on evidence? (Walton et 
al., 2008, p. 310; variables changed to my system, C.L.)  
CHRISTOPH LUMER 
 
15 
 
(The critical questions are differentiated much further in Walton et al., 2008, pp. 92-93, 381-
382.) However, beside this quote, there are several (sometimes only partial) formulations of the 
scheme in Walton et al. (2008) which contain a number of variants. First, the just quoted form of 
the conclusion  
 
 (i) “p is true (false).”  
 
is repeated several times (Walton et al., 2008, pp. 91; 310; 381; examples: 404; 405;  
Walton 2002, p. 50; Walton & Sartor, 2013, p. 117). Intermingled with these occurrences, the 
conclusion  
 
(ii) “p may plausibly taken to be true (false).” 
 
is also used (Walton et al., 2008, pp. 14; 19; 20 (twice); 244 (furthermore in examples: 27; 28: 
401); Walton, 1997, p. 210; Walton, 1996, p. 65). But also a conclusion  
 
(iii) “Plausibly p.”  
 
(Walton et al., 2008, p. 243) appears. Sometimes the preceding premises are even (essentially) 
the same, which is really astonishing. I have not found an explanation of this variation. The fact 
that these variants are used intermingledly (in Walton & Sartor, 2013, p. 117, e.g., version (i) is 
used, immediately following, however, in the conclusion of the argument from witness 
testimony, version (ii) appears) could indicate that Walton et al. (2008) take these variants to be 
equivalent, which, of course, is not only plainly false, but it would also grossly underrate the 
significance of these (and further) variations. Version (i), ‘p is true.’ does not contain any 
modifier and thus no longer indicates that the thesis has not been proved to be true, that it is a 
conclusion of an uncertain argument. According to its content, this conclusion should be used 
like the conclusion of a certain argument, hence as (nearly not) defeasible. And this may lead to 
grossly wrong epistemic decisions if, e.g., counter-evidences are provided. So it is better to insert 
a modifier into the thesis to indicate its uncertain epistemic status. Version (ii), ‘p may plausibly 
taken to be true’, contains an epistemic modifier, but not an understandable one. (What does 
“may taken to be true” mean? Why a triple reservation: “taken to be true”, “may”, “plausibly”?) 
Version (iii), ‘Plausibly p.’ is much better in these respects, but it is not clear either. A further 
problem is that the modifier “plausibly” is only qualitative and hence cannot express the reached 
degree of certainty, which however may be important to know, e.g., if two incompatible theses 
both are “plausible” or, for practical reasons, if we want, e.g., to decide whether to simply run the 
risk that p is false or that taking counter-measure for the case that p is false (p could be ‘no fire 
will break out’ or ‘no earthquake will strike’) is better. And if p itself is a probabilist judgement, 
then the two degrees of uncertainty cannot be combined. For these reasons it is better to use a 
probabilist qualifier in the thesis, which may be really numeric, ‘x%’, or in common language 
ranking terms like ‘extremely / very / rather / somewhat (un-)likely’. Of course, often when 
rationally using an argument from expert opinion we do not have established relative frequencies 
at hand. But in these case we may at least estimate these relative frequencies. 
 However, the insertion of such a quantitative qualifyer into the thesis requires a 
justification for which quantity is to be inserted here. Of course, the adequate basis for this 
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would be the real major premise of the scheme, i.e., a judgement about the relative frequency of 
experts being truthful. This quantitative value of the relative frequency then would reappear in 
the singular conclusion as degree of probability. Of course, often when rationally using an 
argument from expert opinion we do not have established relative frequencies at hand. But in 
these cases we may at least estimate these relative frequencies. Above, the lack of this general 
premise in Walton’s schemes has already been criticized as suppressing the possibility to check 
the fulfilment of an important necessary condition for the inference’s validity. Here, then, we 
have to add a further reason why inserting this premise into the scheme is important: it provides 
us with the information about the degree of certainty based on the relative frequency. And this 
relative frequency may vary, e.g., with respect to the scientific discipline (think, e.g., of 
metereology or philosophy versus physics) or the subject matter; furthermore the arguer may 
have more or less specific and pertinent information about the trustworthiness of experts at her 
disposal, about experts or groups of experts in general and about the specific expert quoted—
e.g., only about the trustworthiness of experts in general, about the trustworthiness of medical 
doctors, about the trustworthiness of honest medical doctors, etc. And with this we come to 
another variety in Walton’s argument schemes from expert opinion: He, Reed and Macagno also 
discuss the insertion of a respective major, conditional premise into the scheme, viz., 
 
Version II and Version IV: “Conditional Premise: If source e is an expert in a 
subject domain f containing proposition p, and e asserts that proposition p is true 
(false), then p may plausibly taken to be true (false).” (Walton et al., 2008, pp. 19- 
20)  
Or 
Version III: “Conditional Premise: If source e is an expert in a subject domain f 
containing proposition p, and e asserts that proposition p is true (false), and e is 
credible as an expert source, and e is an expert in the field p is in, and e asserted p, 
or a statement that implies p, and e is personally reliable as a source, and p is 
consistent with what other experts assert, and e’s assertion is based on evidence, 
then p may plausibly taken to be true (false).” (Walton et al., 2008, p. 20.) 
 
Though Walton et al. (2008) say that the schemes of the argument from expert opinion which 
contain these conditional premises “would work”, they discard them with a superficial reason (p. 
20). In any case these premises contain again the term “may plausibly taken to be true”, to which 
also again the above exposed objections apply; what is needed here instedad is a relative 
frequency judgement. Furthermore, the authors seem to think that (in case one wants to insert 
such a conditional premise) it has to be determined which one. But this is not true; both (with 
some modifications) could work. Which one of the two or of further variants should be used in a 
particular situation depends on the specificity of the available information, expressed also in the 
likewise variable singular premises about the further specifications of the case: trustworthy, 
honest, etc., expert, evidence used by him. And this means that the critical questions representing 
further premises (credibility of this expert (CQ1), personal reliability (CQ4), use of evidence 
(CQ6)) should be inserted into the scheme as well if the respective information is available. (The 
field question (CQ2) and the opinion question (CQ3) are demands to justify the premises already 
given. The answers to them are not part of the argument’s core but enlarge it to a complex of 
arguments.) 
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 One of the critical questions, the consistency question CQ5: ‘Is p consistent with what 
other experts assert?’, neither questions one of the explicit premises nor stands for an implicit 
premise but asks for further relevant information which might undermine the argument or require 
its revision. However, that other experts assert opposing views about the target proposition p is 
only one possibility that one of the persons involved has relevant information which require us to 
no longer use the present argument—instead of inconsistent expert opinion, also reports of 
someone’s experiences may be available, or the addressee himself is an expert and has already 
examined the thesis p. This means for the scheme’s applicability a more general condition that no 
further relevant information is available has to be fulfilled, and this condition should also be 
expressed in the ideal version of the argument though it is usually not made explicit in the 
everyday forms of the argument. 
 Furthermore, the scheme should be based on principles which guarantee the inference’s 
validity, such that if the premises are true, also the conclusion is true or acceptable. I see only 
one group of principles which could guarantee this, viz., those of probability theory. Accordingly, 
the argument scheme ‘argument from expert opinion’ should be orientated towards probability 
theory and also use the categories thereof. 
 Positively implementing the requirements taken from these criticisms, a better argument 
scheme from expert opinion could be this: 
 
Basic probability establishing argument from expert opinion: 
P1:  Source s is an expert in subject domain f . 
P2: Proposition p is in the subject domain f.  
P3: s asserts that p is true. 
P4: If an expert sx in a subject domain fy containing pz asserts that pz is true then pz 
is true in the vast majority (about w%) of cases. 
(P5: NBI: The addressee has no better relevant information about s and p than that 
expressed in P1-P4.) 
T p is highly probable (has a probability of w).  
 
This scheme is a specialization of the more general scheme of ‘basic probability establishing 
argument’ (‘a has the quality F. In most cases relative frequency y where an x is F this x is also 
G. NBI: The addressee has no better information about a and Fs and Gs. Therefore, most 
probably with a probability of y a is also G.’ (cf. Lumer, 2011c, pp. 6, 9, 23)), which elaborates 
one principle of probability theory (the Foundation Principle (Lumer, 2011a, p. 1146)) in an 
argumentative form. This foundation in probability theory guarantees the scheme’s validity. 
Similar schemes could be formulated for cases where more information is available. I think the 
above discussion of Walton’s argumentation scheme ‘argument from expert opinion’ shows that 
the basic probability establishing argument from expert opinion is much better than Walton’s 
respective argumentation scheme. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Walton and his coauthors, as we have seen, have developed a new and important approach to, in 
particular, resolve the problem of the foundations, validity and exact setting of uncertain 
arguments. The particular way they follow is an argumentation schemes approach, which 
combines enthymematic argument schemes with critical questions. The approach is 
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methodologically based on an extensive analysis of a huge data collection of empirically found 
arguments, classification of these arguments and their intuitive assessment. The wealth and 
richness of the provided material and of the observations about it are really impressive. 
 On the other hand, however, the analysis undertaken in this paper has revealed a series of 
defects of this approach. The main methodological problem is the bottom-up approach used, 
which does not lead to a real theory. With respect to contents the main problem (at least until and 
during the time of establishing the compendium) is that no function of arguments is determined, 
which prevents an instrumental construction of criteria for valid arguments which would fulfil 
this function. If one accepts an epistemological determination of the function of arguments, as 
more recently Walton also does (Walton & Sartor, 2013), most of the argument schemes in the 
compendium are not argumentatively valid because they are not based on epistemological 
principles. And, the schemes’ abundance notwithstanding, the compendium is quite incomplete 
in not including many important argument types—which is due to the concretistic approach.  
 In the course of the paper I hope to have shown on several occasions that one can do 
better in these respects by basing the construction of criteria for valid arguments on 
epistemological theories and principles like deductive logic, probability theory and rational 
decision theory. 
 
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Ian Dove for valuable comments on an earlier paper 
which included a critical discussion of Walton’s argument schemes. 
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